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Simon: Gross Profits? An Introduction to a Program on Legal Fees

GROSS PROFITS? AN INTRODUCTION TO A
PROGRAM ON LEGAL FEES
Professor Roy Simon'
Do lawyers earn gross profits? That is, do lawyers earn "too
much"? A recent survey indicates that a majority of people think that
lawyers charge too much,1 and the percentage of people who think
lawyers charge too much has increased sharply in recent years, but is
the public right? The Association of American Law Schools
("AALS") Section on Professional Responsibility organized this symposium to give us some data on that question.2 At the live program,
held on January 7, 1994, the entire audience consisted of law professors who teach and write about professional responsibility. In this
written symposium, we hope to broaden our audience to include lawyers, law students, and other professors.
We liked the title "Gross Profits?" because it gave us a lot of

flexibility to talk about topics that are difficult to research in the
library and are seldom covered in the classroom.3 Eventually, we

decided to focus on lawyer billing practices. But before we ask our
three speakers to discuss billing practices, let me describe a number

of topics that we could have addressed under the rubric of "Gross
* Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law; B.A., 1973, Williams College;
J.D., 1977, N.Y.U. School of Law. When this symposium was held in January of 1994,
Professor Simon was Chair of the Association of American Law Schools Section on Professional Responsibility, and he moderated the live program.
1. A Survey of Attitudes Nationwide Toward Lawyers and the Legal System, PETER D.
HART RESEARCH ASSOCiATES, INC. (Washington, D.C.), Jan. 1993, at 18-19.
2. The Association of American Law Schools is the main umbrella organization for
legal educators. Virtually all American and Canadian law schools are full or partial members
of the AALS. The AALS holds an annual meeting each January. This symposium was organized by the AALS Section on Professional Responsibility and was held in Orlando, Florida.
We are grateful to the Hofstra Law Review for editing and publishing the symposium.
3. Near the start of the program, I asked for a show of hands to indicate whether the
professors in the audience spent any time on lawyer billing practices in their courses on professional responsibility, (I made it clear that I was asking specifically about time spent on
lawyer billing practices, not about legal fees in general.). Roughly one-third of the people in
the audience said they did. However, fewer than ten percent said they spent an entire class
on billing practices, and only one person in the audience said he spent more than one class
on billing practices. We hope that the information in this symposium will enable professors
to spend more time discussing billing practices.
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Profits?" but decided not to. I mention these "wannabe" topics because they represent areas where fruitful research could be
done-especially empirical research, of which there is far too little.
I. WHAT WE COULD HAVE COVERED
Using the title "Gross Profits?" we could have presented a program about any of the following intriguing topics:
Law firm profits. We could have discussed in some detail law
firm profits. We could have looked through the National Law
Journal's top 250 firms or the American Lawyer "100" to see what
types of firms are earning a lot of money.4 For example, we would
ask which fields of law, which geographic areas, what total size, what
kinds of clients, and what partner-to-associate ratios produce the highest revenues per partner. Then, using whatever moral compass we
follow, we could try to decide whether the partners are earning too
much.
Lawyer incomes. We could have looked at the incomes of lawyers in general. The public thinks lawyers make a lot of money, but
there is not much hard data. A study of New York lawyers, released
in late 1993, found that twenty-five percent of all New York lawyers
earn less than $46,000 per year; fifty percent make less than $90,000
a year; seventy-six percent make less than $120,000 per a year; and
only twenty-four percent make over $120,000 per year.' Does that
make lawyers wealthy? We cannot say, but the information accompanying the New York State Bar Association study says that Archibald
R. Murray, president of the Association, hopes the findings will combat the image that all lawyers make large sums of money.6
Contingent fees. We could have talked about contingent fees.
Several topics would have been interesting. For example:

4. The National Law Journal annually publishes a detailed list of revenue information
about the top 250 law firms. See, e.g., Annual Survey of the Nation's Largest Firms; The
NUJ 250, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 27, 1993, at S5. The American Lawyer publishes a similar list
with somewhat different data. See, e.g., Alphabetic List of Am Law 100 Firms, AM. L., JulyAug. 1994, at 7.
5. Briefly .... NAT'L L. J., Jan. 10, 1994, at 2.
6. lit
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- Effective hourly rates. We could have looked at effective
hourly rates in contingent fee cases. Professor Lester Brickman of
Cardozo Law School, among others, has done a lot of work in this
area and he reports that it is routine for certain lawyers on contingent
fee to earn $1,000 or $2,000 or even $5,000 an hour.' In a few instances, such as asbestos cases (which may be an aberration),
Brickman reports effective hourly rates up to $50,000 per hour.8 That
is very good work if you can get it.
- Risk-to-return ratios. We could have examined risk-toreturn ratios on contingent fees. How many lawyers are charging their
standard contingent fees for cases with relatively little risk? For example, how many lawyers are charging their standard contingent fees
for obtaining a settlement that is only slightly better than what the
defendant offered the client before the lawyer was even retained?
How many lawyers are charging standard contingent fees for handling
cases such as comparative negligence cases where liability is virtually
certain and the only question is the amount of damages? (By the
way, although we tend to think of the standard contingent fee as onethird of the recovery, Brickman reports that contingent fees of forty
percent or fifty percent are increasingly common, even in cases with
minimal risk of non-recovery.)9
• Unethicalfee structures. We could have looked at unethical fee structures. A Florida lawyer, for example, was recently suspended because his contingent fee retainer provided that if he withdrew from a case, he was nevertheless entitled to quantum meruit for
the time he had spent up to the time of his withdrawal plus one-third
of the contingent fee received by the lawyer who took over the
case.' o The Florida Bar thought that it was excessive and the Florida
Supreme Court agreed."
• Non-refundable fees. We could have looked at the ethics
of non-refundable fees and minimum fees. For example, we could

7. Lester Brickman, On the Relevance of the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence: Tort
System Outcomes Are Principally Determined by Lawyer's Rates of Return, 15 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1755. 1773 (1994).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1772 n.52.
10. Florida Bar v. Hollander, 607 So. 2d 412, 414-15 (Fla. 1992).
11. Id.
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have discussed the leading case, In re Cooperman," which was decided by the New York Court of Appeals less than two months before our symposium. Cooperman was charging $5000, $10,000, sometimes $15,000 in non-refundable fees in divorce cases and criminal
cases. His retainer agreement said that no matter how little work he
did on the case, and no matter what the reason for his withdrawal,
his fee was not refundable. 3 The Court of Appeals found that practice to be unethical-but the court left open the door for "minimum
fees," which look a lot like non-refundable fees. 4 What are the rules
on minimum fees and non-refundable fees now? What should they
be?
Legal fees in divorce cases. We could have devoted our
entire symposium to legal fees in divorce cases. For example, we
could have studied New York's new rules on divorce fees, which
became effective November 30, 1993.'" These tough new rules require divorce lawyers to estimate what their total bill will be, and to
give divorce clients a lengthy statement on client rights, before beginning any legal work.' 6 Or, we could have discussed a disturbing but
fairly common tactic of some Chicago law firms.'7 These firms generate business by taking on new clients in divorce cases and churning
the file until the client runs out of money for legal fees. Then the
firm withdraws.
* Statutory fees. We could have studied statutory fees in
civil rights cases to see whether civil rights lawyers are earning gross
profits. We could start with the example of Riverside v. Rivera,"
where a $33,350 damage award produced a $245,456.25 fee award.'9

12. 83 N.Y.2d 465 (1994).
13. Id. at 469.
14. Id. at 473-76.
15. The new rules apply to lawyers representing clients in "divorce, separation, annulment, custody, visitation, maintenance, child support, or alimony, or to enforce or modify a
judgment or order in connection with any such claims, actions or proceedings." N.Y. DoM.
RaL. LAW § 1400.1 (McKinney 1994).
16. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §1400.2-.4 (McKinney 1994).
17. John Elson, a professor at Northwestern University whose teaching duties include
clinical work, told me about this problem. His clinic litigates a lot of divorce fee cases in
Chicago and he reports that this is a fairly common practice. He did not know exactly why
courts are letting firms out of cases when they use this tactic of churning the file and then
moving to withdraw.
18. 477 U.S. 561 (1986).
19. Id. at 565.
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The award was affirmed by the Supreme Court over a sharp dissent
by Justice Rehnquist and then-Chief Justice Burger, who thought the
fee was excessive.' We could follow up to see whether civil rights
lawyers have continued to win such generous fee awards. But we
would need to raise the counter-example of Farrar v. Hobby,21
where a lawyer litigated for many years, and won, but was awarded
no fee because the complaint sought $17,000,000 but the jury awarded only a dollar.' We would also need to look at City of Burlington
v. Dague, where the Supreme Court held that multipliers for the
risk of non-recovery in statutory fee cases are improper.' I suspect
we would have concluded that civil rights lawyers are not earning
gross profits, but empirical work needs to be done.
* Monopoly profits. We could have taken a macro-economic
approach and asked whether lawyers are earning monopoly profits.
Lawyers are licensed to enter a field that is heavily protected by
unauthorized practice laws, and enforcement of unauthorized practice
laws is undergoing a revival in some jurisdictions. Even those who
graduate from law school must surmount barriers to entry in the form
of a bar exam and a character and fitness test-and some have alleged that the bar exam is graded not with an eye to competence but
rather with an eye toward controlling the number of lawyers.' To
make matters worse, non-lawyers cannot share in our monopoly fees
because Rule 5.4 of the American Bar Association ("ABA") Model
Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits lawyers from sharing legal
fees with non-lawyers.' (For good measure, the same rule prohibits
lawyers from forming partnerships with non-lawyers if any of the
partnership's activities include the practice of law.)2' There is substantial pressure in many quarters to relax the laws prohibiting unauthorized practice, but lawyers are a long way from giving up their

20. IL at 581, 587-95.
21. 113 S. Ct. 566 (1992).
22. ld at 570-71.
23. 112 S. CL 449 (1992).
24. Id at 459.
25. This was the central allegation in Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 579-80 (1984),
in which an applicant who had failed the bar exam challenged Arizona's method of setting a
passing grade for the bar exam. The case was dismissed on grounds that the Arizona Supreme Court was immune from antitrust liability under the state action doctrine established in
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
26. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 5.4 (1983).
27. Id.
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exclusive right to practice law and the monopoly profits that go with
it.
The global marketplace. We could have addressed an even
broader macro-economic question: Are excessive legal fees crippling
America's ability to compete in the global marketplace? During the
1992 presidential campaign, former President George Bush cited a
study by the National Association of Manufacturers claiming that
American consumers and companies would spend up to $200 billion
on legal services during 1992.' But Professor Mark Galanter of the
University of Wisconsin has extensively researched this figure and has
demonstrated that it is wrong. 29 In a recent article in the Denver
Law Review entitled News from Nowhere: The Debased Debate on
Civil Justice,"' Professor Galanter shows that America does not
spend anything close to $200 billion a year on legal services.3"
Galanter concludes, however, that we simply do not have an adequate
knowledge base about our legal system, and he decries our ignorance,
saying:
Why do we tolerate a knowledge base about the legal system
that is so thin and spotty? Compared to the economy or health care
or education, research about legal processes, especially civil, is
ludicrously thin; so thin that it is perfectly routine for far-reaching
policy proposals to be advanced on the basis of tendentious macroanecdotes and voodoo numbers.3"
Pertinent to our program here today, Professor Galanter does not
spare the law schools. He says:
But what about our vast archipelago of law schools, whose
professors and students fill hundreds of journals with the products
of legal scholarship? This great flood of scholarship does not provide an adequate knowledge base, because, basically, it is not interested in the working of the legal system.
Abetted by the bar, law schools have largely defaulted on their
responsibility to contribute to knowledge about the working of the

28. Marc Galanter, News From Nowhere: The Debased Debate on Civil Justice, 71
DENV. U. L. REv. 101, 111-12 (1993).

29. lIa
30. 71 DENv. U. L. REv. 101 (1993).

31. Id. at 112-14.
32.

it. at 124.
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legal process. It is as if we had a medical establishment consisting
entirely of practicing physicians and theoretical biologists, with no
research institutions like the National Institutes of Health and no
public
health monitoring facilities like the Center for Disease Con33
trol!
In this symposium, we are interested in the working of the legal
process. And we have found three people who know a good bit about
the slice of the legal process that we will be covering. So let me tell
you exactly what we will be addressing.
11.

WHAT WE WILL COVER: LAWYER BILLING PRACHTCES

We are going to cover lawyer billing practices in hourly rate
cases. Our focus will be on why so many people think legal bills are
too high, and what people mean when they say the bills are too high.
Do they mean that the bills are too high in some moral sense (i.e.,
"gross" or obscene)? Do they mean that lawyers are billing for unnecessary work, or are billing for work that could have been performed more efficiently? Or, on a more sinister note, do people mean
that lawyers are billing for work they did not even do (i.e., that lawyers are submitting fraudulent bills)?
Intertwined with these questions are parallel questions about
expenses. In hourly rate cases, lawyers universally bill not only for
their time but also for their expenses.
These are very current topics. Let me provide some examples:
At the time of the symposium, I picked up the Wall Street Journal and found a major story on how corporate clients were trying to
control legal fees.' Summarizing a new survey by Of Counsel, a
newsletter for the legal profession, the story reports that companies
"are increasingly asking outside law firms to bid for legal work, a development that lawyers are none too enthusiastic about."'3 The survey indicates that one-third of the large clients surveyed are asking
law firms to submit proposals for prospective legal work, and sixty
percent of the firms requesting proposals think they were working
very well-but only twenty-nine percent bf law firms thought that
these proposals were working very well.' Why the difference? Partly

33.
34.
1994, at
35.
36.

Id.at 124-25.
Ellen Joan Pollack, More Clients Ask Firms to Bid for Work, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 6,
B3.
ld.
Id&
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because the law flrms have to do a lot of work for free to produce a
proposal. The net result is lower fees, both because of competition for
the low bid and the free work included in the proposal.
Also at time of the symposium, I was given a free copy of the
Los Angeles Daily Journal and I came across a front page story about
a criminal fraud trial accusing a law firm of systematically padding
bills, as in the book (and movie) The Firm.' The scheme worked
like this: the managing partner at a workers' compensation defense
firm concluded that the lawyers in his firm were not billing all of the
time they were spending, so he devised a system that would recapture
"lost" time. If an attorney billed .2 hours, the managing partner automatically bumped it to .3 hours, and if an attorney billed .3 hours,
the managing partner automatically bumped it up to .4 hours. The
theory was that the attorneys recorded less time than these things
actually took. The managing partner did not deny that he had bumped
up the recorded hours, but argued that it was justified as a more
accurate reflection of the time spent than the recorded hours."
Shortly after the symposium, the American Bar Association's
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility released a formal ethics opinion on billing clients for fees and expenses.39 The opinion advised that a lawyer who spends four hours at the
courthouse attending motion arguments for three different clients on
the same day may not bill each client for the full four hours (i.e., the
lawyer may not ethically bill twelve hours for only four hours of
work).4" A lawyer who spends (and bills) ten hours drafting a research memorandum for one client may not charge a second hourly
rate client the same ten hours for the same memorandum if it takes
less than ten hours to update the memo.4 In sum, the Ethics Committee said:
[a] lawyer who has undertaken to bill on an hourly basis is
never justified in charging a client for hours not actually expended.
If a lawyer has agreed to charge the client on this basis and it turns

37. Hallye Jordan, Firm's Billing Is Defended In Fraud Trial - Partner Denies Pad.
ding, L.A. DAILY J., Dec. 13, 1993, at 1. The Los Angeles Daily Journal is the daily legal

newspaper in Southern California and is one of the leading legal newspapers in the country.
38. Id.
39. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Resposibility, Formal Op. 93-379 (1993).
40. Id. ("A lawyer who spends four hours of time on behalf of three clients has not
earned twelve billable hours.").

41. Id. ("A lawyer who is able to reuse old work product has not re-earned the hours
previously billed and compensated when the work product was first generated.").
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out that the lawyer is particularly efficient in accomplishing a given
result, it nonetheless will not be permissible to charge the client for
more hours that were actually expended on the matter .... This is
not to say that the lawyer who agreed to hourly compensation is not
free, with full disclosure, to suggest additional compensation because
of a particularly efficient or outstanding result, or because the lawyer was able to reuse prior work product on the client's behalf. The
point here is that fee enhancement cannot be accomplished simply
by presenting the client with a statement reflecting more billable
hours than were actually expended.42
On the subject of expenses, which play an increasingly important
part in law firm profits, the Ethics Committee opined that a lawyer
who receives a discount from a court reporting firm or other vendor
must pass the discount along to the client unless the client consents
otherwise,"

and

that-absent

a specific

agreement

to the

con-

trary-services like photocopying, computer research, and on-site
meals may be billed to clients only at the cost of the services plus
the reasonable overhead associated with those services.'
The ABA's opinion on fees and expenses generated a good bit
of press, including a fairly sarcastic op-ed column from sociologist
Amitai Etzioni asking why lawyers needed to be told these things at
45
all.
In the Spring of 1994, several months after our symposium,
Associate Attorney General Webster Hubbell resigned amidst charges
that before he joined the Department of Justice he had overbilled his
clients back in Arkansas by hundreds of thousands of dollars.' Mr.
Hubbell's hero-to-zero resignation added nothing new to the intellectual aspects of billing theory, but it did add a powerful anecdote to
the stories we can tell about the penalties for questionable billing
practices.
Finally, the August 1994 ABA Journal ran a feature article entitled Greed, Ignorance and Overbilling,' which discusses sixty-hour
days, double billing, criminal convictions for overbilling, and other

42. ld.
43. I&
44. Id. For photocopies, for example, the lawyer may charge both the actual cost of
each copy plus overhead items such as the salary of the photocopy machine operator.
45. Amnitai Etzioni, What's Wrong, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 14, 1994, at A17.
46. John M. Broder & Ronald J. Ostraw, Hubbell Quits; Top Justice Aide, Clinton
Friend, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1994, at Al.
47. Darlene Ricker, Greed, Ignorance and Overbilling, 80 A.B.A. J. 62, 62-63 (1994).
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misdeeds of lawyers suffering from "greedlock" (my term).48 The
article also discusses the small but growing number of lawyers who
make a living by auditing legal bills.49 We are fortunate that John
Marquess, one of the most prominent legal auditors, was able to
participate in this symposium. His article, filled with surprising illustrations of unethical conduct from actual legal bills, is likely to trouble and provoke you.
Lawyer billing practices are something of a mystery. The only
people who know whether lawyers overcharge are the lawyers who
send the bills, the clients who receive the bills, the people who audit
the bills, and the scholars who study the bills. Lots of people send
and receive legal bills, but little scholarly research has been done
about billing practices because lawyers are seldom willing to disclose
their billing practices (would Macy tell Gimbel?), and the confidentiality rules probably prohibit lawyers from showing scholars copies
of actual bills.
One exception is a 1991 survey of billing practices by Professor
'William Ross of Cumberland School of Law." Professor Ross collected data about overbilling from 272 private attorneys and 80 inhouse lawyers, from law firms and companies of all sizes, in many
geographic locations.5' A whopping ninety-two percent of the lawyers who responded believed that lawyers intentionally inflate their
hours, and sixty-five percent knew of specific instances of padding. 2
Another exception is a 1990 survey of lawyers by Professor Lisa
Lerman of Catholic University School of Law.53 This article presented gripping stories of the ways in which lawyers lie to their clients
about legal bills.' Professor Lerman's article attracted widespread
attention in the popular press, including a column by New York Times
legal writer David Margolick 5 As a result, Professor Lerman has
been a lightning rod for other attorneys who have wanted to talk
about deceptive billing practices. Professor Lerman is taking part in

48. Id.
49. Id. at 65. The story prominently mentions Philadelphia legal auditor John Marquess,
who takes part in this symposium.
50. William 0. Ross, The Ethics of Hourly Billing by Attorneys, 44 RuTGERs L. REV. 1

(1991).
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.at 5.
Id.at 93.
Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 659 (1990).
it

55. David Margolick, At the Bar; Spot Quiz: What Are You Punished for as a Schoolchild but not as a Lawyer?, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 18, 1994, at A22.
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this symposium, and will tell us some fascinating stories about
overbilling and what might be done to curb it.
Finally, and fittingly, we have a client on our symposium panel
to discuss legal fees from a client's perspective. This is no ordinary
client. This is Citibank Credit Corporation, the people who bring you
Citibank's MasterCard and Visa cards. The corporation spends $33
million -each year on legal fees. The entire legal budget is overseen
by one man, Duncan MacDonald, who is Vice-President and General
Counsel of Citicorp Credit. Mr. MacDonald is taking part in our
symposium, and will give us the views of a client who works with
some 2,000 different law firms around the country each year.
Thus, our symposium brings you the perspectives of a client, an
auditor, and a scholar. At the end, we add the questions and comments of the audience, including comments by several of the most
prominent scholars in the field of legal ethics. (At the AALS Annual
Meeting, the word was that the live symposium was highly provocative and that the comments from the audience got hot and heavy.)
The only perspective we are not giving you is the perspective of
the lawyers who send the bills. I guess the lawyers-and their bills
-will have to speak for themselves. Let us hope that this symposium
will spur all of us, including lawyers, to learn more and to think
more deeply and more carefully about lawyer billing practices.
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